Getting a Job in Finance:The Strength of Collaboration Ties by Godechot, Olivier
Getting a job in finance.  
The strength of  collaboration ties 
 
Olivier Godechot 
 
 
WORK IN PROGRESS 
 
DO NOT QUOTE 
 
Abstract : Since the seminal papers of Mark Granovetter, Getting a job and “The Strength 
of Weak Ties”, it has been acknowledged that contacts are a valuable way of getting a job, and 
that weak ties are more efficient than strong ties because the former convey more original 
information than the latter. We would like to challenge this overemphasizing focus of network 
sociology on information. We first return to Granovetter’s empirical work and show that the 
“weak ties” that seem the more helpful for getting jobs are generally former colleagues. One 
reason for this feature is not that former colleagues increase ego’s information but rather that 
they value the pursuit of past collaboration. We examine then the consequence of collabora-
tion ties hypothesis in the financial industry labor market. Based on results of previous 
research, we explain why collaboration ties may be so valuable. In finance, the labor market 
values the assets that financial operatives take with them from one firm to another such as 
knowledge, know-how, customers. Since assets are to a certain extent shared among cowork-
ers, it is worth hiring business relations, former colleagues or moving in teams: it enables a 
better transfer of assets such as idiosyncratic working routines, distributed knowledge, or joint 
customers. To demonstrate our claims we rely on an internet survey launched with efinancial-
carreers.fr collected in 09/2008 among French financial employees (n=995).  This question-
naire shows that working in core finance favors the accumulation of moveable key assets on 
the one hand and of collaboration ties on the other hand, that collaboration ties and moveable 
key assets are strongly correlated. Move of key assets, collaboration ties and more over the 
combination of those two dimensions increases wages. Although firms try to attach key 
workers holding such advantages with some contractual devices, those strategies fail since 
many employee, in order to remain in contact with those attractors, smooth rather than 
impeach those mobilities. Finally this paper suggest that the real firm is maybe not the formal 
firm but rather reside between firms in the networks of collaboration ties formed by moving 
employees. 
 
Since the seminal works of Mark Granovetter, Getting a job (1974) and “The 
Strength of Weak Ties” (1973), research in social science has been increasingly 
emphasizing the sole informational dimension of networks in job search and 
job mobility. Theoretically, the weak ties - strong ties argument has been 
simplified into a more structural approach, with the alternate diversified - 
redundant ties, implied by the structural hole argument (Burt, 1992). Therefore 
contacts are viewed mainly, if not exclusively, especially in economic models, 
as information processors diffusing to ego, at a rate depending on the network 
structure, new information about job vacancies (Boorman, 1975; Montgomery, 
1992; Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 2004). Contacts play therefore benevo-
lently the role of job agencies or that of head-hunters providing at potential 
employers and employees valuable trustworthy information (Finlay and Cover-
dill, 2002; Lin, 2001). Nevertheless, empirical research on the value of informa-
tional network provided mixed results (Granovetter, 1983, 1995, 2005; Lin, 
1999; Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 2004). Several studies find a relation 
between weak ties and final status or wage, but a relation that appears to be 
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mediated through a third variable like the status of the contact (Lin et alii., 
1981; Wegener, 1991). Other studies based on national wide sample find no 
clear relation between the strength of tie and pay (Bridges and Villemez, 1986, 
Mouw, 2003). This overemphasis on information has been also challenged by 
researches that claim that strong ties can also be helpful, for different reasons 
than weak ties, because strong ties, although providing maybe less original 
information, might be more motivated to support and to influence the decision 
makers (Bian, 1997; Yakubovich, 2005). We might have two mechanisms 
playing at the same, informing weak ties and supporting strong ties, producing 
a rather undetermined relation between strength of ties and value of the job.  
Nevertheless, both approaches are similar in the way they view contacts in 
job change. They both separate too strongly, job search episodes and working 
episodes. The typical situation of these frameworks is that of an unemployed 
person or a person unhappy at work, who is trying to find a new job and who 
is asking contacts either (or both) for information or for support. In this 
framework, contacts, although they may be willing to help, remain more or less 
indifferent to the firm where ego will find a job. They give information because 
giving information is not very costly and they can expect information in return 
or they help someone to whom they are bounded and they can expect some 
kind of future reciprocity. This type of approach does not enable us to under-
stand why the contact is so often a work contact, such as a former colleague or 
a former client, who moreover frequently holds part if not totally the power to 
recruit (Granovetter, 1974; Bridges and Villemez, 1986, Yakubovich, 2005). 
Work ties like former colleagues are generally classified as weak ties. This 
statement is correct if we measure it with emotional intensity, but it can be 
challenged if we measure it with the amount of time spent when ego and 
contact worked together. But classifying work contacts in weak-strong tie 
dimension obscures the fact that work contacts can not be seen as independent 
from the object of the quest. In those types of help, when a former colleague 
helps to hire a former colleague, what is at stake is nothing less than the pursuit 
of a fruitful work collaboration. It is therefore not surprising to see that in 
Bridges and Villemez (1986) the distinction between work and communal ties 
is more relevant that the classical weak-strong ties in order to explain wages 
and that its effect is significant at least in important subsample like Manager-
Professional-Technical workers.  
Financial industry is a good observatory for studying the impact of collabo-
ration ties. As regards the importance of network and social ties, finance offers 
to the media two contradictory images, that of a world of selfishness and of 
great solitude, and that of a closed network of highly tied insiders. A way of 
reconciling those two views is to see that finance is structured not by strong 
emotional ties, but by highly structured collaboration ties that studies view as 
important for success (Roth, 2006; Burt, 1997). Finance is also a sector where 
pay and inequalities have been rising tremendously, benefiting from a wage 
premium that remains unexplained (Philippon, Resheff, 2009; Kaplan, Rauh, 
2009). In previous work (Godechot, 2007, 2008a), we argue that those wages 
were due to financial operatives capacities to commit hold-up, that is to 
threaten efficiently the firm to move the firms key assets to a competitor. In 
our framework those assets like knowledge, technologies, clients, are appropri-
ated by financial employees and multiplied by collaboration ties leading to 
some spectacular team move (Godechot, 2008a, 2008b). This paper intends to 
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deepen the theoretical link between moveable assets and collaboration ties and 
to offer a statistical exploration of its importance relying on an internet survey 
launched with efinancial-carreers.fr collected in September 2008.  
Paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we first return to 
Granovetter’s empirical work and show that below weak ties we have very 
often collaboration ties. We then develop a theoretical framework that links in 
finance the importance of collaboration ties with the appropriation of key 
moveable assets. The third section presents the questionnaire on job mobility 
in financial industry, and the main variables. We confirm in the fourth section 
our hypothesis linking moveable assets and collaboration ties to one another, 
and those related dimensions to a job position at the core of financial markets 
and to higher wages. The fifth section shows that the combination of move-
able assets and collaboration ties helps also to circumvent the contractual 
devices that try to refrain turn-over. In the final discussion section, we analyze 
how collaboration ties may challenge the traditional way of viewing the nature 
of the firm in finance, and second and how they are related to classical meas-
ures of network structure. 
1. Information or collaboration: Are they so weak?  
It is quite common to link Granovetter’s theory on weak ties (1973) and 
Getting a job (1974), his study about job search in a Boston suburb. Granovet-
ter’s theory is by now almost common knowledge. Ego’s different strong ties 
are very likely to be connected to one another, whereas ego’s weak ties are 
more likely to live in different and rather unconnected groups. While different 
strong ties, already connected would share more or less the same information, 
weak ties on the contrary serve as bridge between various circles and may 
provide ego with new and valuable information.  
Granovetter relies partly on his 1974 study on contact in order to establish 
his general claim explaining that weak ties is a very valuable mean in order to 
get jobs. 
 
“I have used the following categories for frequency of contact: often = 
at least twice a week; occasionally = more than once a year but less 
than twice a week; rarely once a year or less. Of those finding a job 
through contacts, 16.7% reported that they saw their contact often at 
the time, 55.6% said occasionally, and 27.8% rarely (N=54). The skew 
is clearly to the weak end of the continuum, suggesting the primacy of 
structure over motivation.” 
 
This first kind of proof is rather loose since we do not know the general 
frequency of all ego’s contacts1. The book, while it does establish that getting a 
job through personal contacts enables to more satisfying and a better paid job 
than through formal means and direct application (1974, p. 13-14), does not 
give much proofs of the strength of weak ties compared to strong ties. It 
shows that weak ties, defined by the intensity of contacts, are negatively 
correlated to unemployment and positively correlated to sending good words 
to the employer (1974, p. 54). 
                                                 
1 Granovetter do recognize this objection in a footnote p. 1372. 
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Who are the contacts that are generally involved in Granovetter’s survey: 
they are mainly work contacts.  
“In many cases, the contact was someone only marginally included 
in the current network of contacts, such as an old college friend or a 
former workmate or employer, with whom sporadic contact had been 
maintained (Granovetter 1970, pp. 76-80). Usually such ties had not 
even been very strong when first forged. For work-related ties, respon-
dents almost invariably said that they never saw the person in a non-
work context. Chance meetings or mutual friends operated to reactivate 
such ties. It is remarkable that people receive crucial information from 
individuals whose very existence they have forgotten. (1973, p. 1371).” 
Although Granovetter does not say that a proxy of weak ties could be work 
contacts and that of strong ties could be family and friends, such a shortcut is 
nearly suggested. 31% of the contacts are coded “family-social” and 69% 
“Work” relation, among which we find 21% of former teacher, 36% of former 
employer or superviser, and 33% of former colleagues (1974, p. 46). Those 
work ties seem valuable since that they are more likely to be associated with a 
better pay. Moreover those former colleagues have a much higher probability 
than other contacts of becoming the new employer or the new supervisor 
(1974, p. 47). To put it in a nutshell former colleagues hire former colleagues. 
The reason for such a feature may be quite different from the weak tie ar-
gument. The weak tie argument relies on the value of a new information 
provided at time t by weak ties. If your former supervisor quits, works for 
another firm and three month later calls you back and offers you to work again 
for him in his new firm, would we say that it is a weak tie? It may not be a 
strong tie, since this emotional intensity of the relation may be quite low. But 
since the working contacts were regular before quitting, the supervisor and the 
subordinate did share already quite a lot of information on each other, and 
neither the former nor the latter do learn in this phone call much more than 
the possibility of working again together.  
Although it could still be possible to analyze this case in the information ties 
framework, it is tempting to provide another reason why this type of working 
ties work. They are collaboration ties. We can talk of collaboration ties when 
people produce more together than separately. Complementarities is not just of 
complementarities of skill as in Kremer’s framework (Kremer, 1993), but are 
personal complementarities. Two coworkers learn to coordinate, to share work 
and they only become and their team becomes productive with time. It is 
collaboration asset that they may want to preserve. That is why if one moves 
and has the opportunity of favoring the recruitment of the other, rather then 
learning at some expense to cooperate with some stranger, he will do so. 
Cooperating with coworkers is quite common and if we were to state this 
phenomena alone, for instance on a national sample (Bridges, Villemez, 1986), 
it is likely that it would have rather little consequences. What we need to do 
now, is to identify a factor that helps to turn cooperation relations in collabora-
tion ties on the labor market. 
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2. Collaboration ties in finance 
Let us now give a theoretical framework based both on qualitative research 
in the financial industry (Godechot, 2007, 2008a, 2008b) and on previous 
literature that analyses the factors that favors the use of collaboration ties.  
Collaboration ties are more likely to be important when two persons linked 
together share a common asset, that they organize a division of labor in order 
to exploit and value this shared asset and that it is possible to move this asset 
from one firm to another.  
As we have shown in previous analysis (Godechot, 2008a), financial indus-
try is a sector where employee tend to accumulate key assets of the firm and to 
move them from one firm to another. These assets might be knowledge, 
know-how, idiosyncratic routines, software and hardware, reputation, or client 
relationships. Although financial industry is hiring people with an important 
human capital, what people move from one firm to another is not limited to 
individual talent. Therefore on the long run, employees in finance are paid a 
rent that classical human capital variables fail to reduce (Philippon, Resheff, 
2009; Kaplan, Rauh, 2009). Although good ideas are seen commonly as the 
pure product of an individual mind, network sociology has shown that they 
rely also on a collective context and a network structure (Collins, 1998 ; Burt, 
2004).  Both insiders account of financial industry (Lewis, 1989) and scholars 
have shown the importance of mentors (Roth, 2006) in the financial industry 
from whom you learn both the job and the tips in order to survive in this 
rather competitive universe. The trading room, with its characteristic open 
space, is a locus where people learn a lot from each other through informal 
conversations (Beunza, Starck, 2004). But movable assets are not limited to 
acquired knowledge, experience and on the job training. Knowledge is often 
embedded in electronic devices that may be easy to move from one firm to 
another. For instance, a trader interviewed in 2002, explained that when he 
moved from a small French broker in Paris to a major American investment 
bank in London, bringing his laptop to the new firm was a key issue: inside the 
laptop was a software that he developed with others at his previous firm which 
could do some innovative pricing of convertible bonds, which are complex 
financial derivative (Godechot, 2007). One classical element that is often 
moved from one firm to another is the client relationship. Hence brokers and 
sales build progressively with their clients an idiosyncratic relationship both 
through formal and informal, professional and non-professional conversation. 
One of the issue of the building of those relationships, that may rely on 
exogenous similarities like that of gender or of social background (Roth, 2006), 
is to build a shared vision of the market between the sales and client (Smith, 
1999, Ortiz, 2003). If a sales moves to another firm, his client might be willing 
to continue discuss with him, listen his advices, and have transactions with 
him. Moreover, with standardized products, priced very similarly in different 
markets, what makes the difference is the complex “chemical” that transforms 
the customers of the firm into a client of the sales.  
Jobs in financial industry differ in the amount of assets an employee can 
appropriate and in the extent those assets are movable. We may think that jobs 
at the core of financial market, front-office traders and sales, are jobs where 
assets are more appropriable and easier to move. The first reason is that jobs in 
front office are highly specialized (Rajan, Zingales, 2001). It is more likely to 
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appropriate a key asset if you are in a long term work relation with the assets. 
If you start as a derivative trader, it is likely that you will remain a trader in the 
same area as long as you can, working on the same financial products. On the 
contrary, if you are back-office manager, you will probably move inside your 
job every few months from one project to another (building new software, 
reorganizing the unit, cost-cutting, etc.) and every few years move internally 
from one job to the other inside the support departments of the same firm 
(back-office, accounting, HR, IT).  The second reason is that the organization 
of work is rather standardized in front offices whereas it is more firm specific 
in the support departments. The more similar the organizations are, the easier 
it is to move assets and to value them inside a new environment. In trading and 
sales activity, organization is pretty similar. This isomorphism both eases the 
recruitment of external traders and sales but enables some internal traders and 
sales to quit and take along key assets accumulated during their work in the 
firm. On the contrary, in the back-office even if you can more or less appro-
priate an asset through a long term relationship working on it (for instance in 
some IT jobs when you build an internal software), it might be less valuable to 
move this asset if it does not fit in the others firm organization. We may 
therefore sum up those elements in the following hypothesis: 
H1: Working in core finance favors the accumulation of moveable key assets 
When a person moves alone, he/she might not move all the key assets 
he/she was holding in the previous firm. This will especially occur when assets 
are shared among several coworkers. In such case, moving in team, with 
coworkers sharing the same assets, increases the average asset moved per 
capita. Groysberg et alii. (2008) have therefore shown that financial analysts 
suffer generally a loss of reputation when they move alone from one firm to 
another, but that this loss disappears when they move in team with other 
colleagues. In our interpretation, reputation can be viewed as a collective asset 
that is based both on the financial analyst individual initial talent, his on the job 
acquired experience and also the quality of the surrounding team supporting 
him in his analysis, the quality of service the firm provides to clients, the trust 
relationship built with customers, etc. Alone, a financial analyst move part of 
this idiosyncratic bundle and suffer a loss of reputation. But with colleagues 
those assets are much more portable.  
Collaboration relations therefore do matter, since they enable collective 
moves of assets. The first and most common thing that is moved is all the 
idiosyncratic routines that members have been collectively building together in 
order to coordinate. When moving alone, rebuilding coordination with new 
colleagues can be costly and timely. When moving collectively, efforts invested 
in those activities are spared and this enables a rapid productivity in the new 
environment. More, the idiosyncratic routines of division of labor will settle 
productive complementarities within the team (among traders, among sales, 
between a trader or a sale and its assistant) with valuable division of tasks, of 
knowledge, of products, of clients and share of information and expertise. 
Finally, some underlying assets are even more deeply shared among coworkers. 
A same client may be shared for different products among several salesper-
sons, some selling derivatives, others selling stocks. The valuation of a financial 
product like equity or credit derivatives involves also the combination of 
trading teams (that manage financial portfolios) and sales teams (that manage 
clients). Heads of trading room that can through collaboration ties move both 
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teams more or less capture the power to move the financial activity itself 
(Godechot, 2008b).  
Moving in team and hiring teams in financial industry is quite common in 
financial industry (Godechot, 2007, 2008b). Groysberg et alii. remark that 
investment bankers have a typical expression, “block trading in people”, to 
name the phenomenon. Of the 366 analyst-moves collected in their database, 
100 are team move involving colleagues such as “other ranked analysts, junior 
analysts, institutional salespeople, and traders”. This figure is all the more 
impressive that financial analyst is probably not the job the most akin to move 
in team as compared to other jobs like traders or sales. Although, to my 
knowledge, we do not have a precise estimation of such collective moves, cases 
reported in the newspapers show the importance of the phenomenon. For 
instance Frank Quattrone in Private Equity is reported having moved from 
Morgan Stanley to Deutsche Bank Securities with 8 colleagues in 1996 and to 
move again with two other bankers and their 100 persons team in 1998 for 
Credit Suisse2. Team moves are also at the origin of most hedge funds. John 
Merriwether has first built LTCM in 1994 with a team of former colleagues 
working under his direction at Salomon Brothers (MacKenzie, 2003). 
But collaboration ties are not only involved in very spectacular and dramatic 
one shot collective moves. The latter are valuable but difficult to set up consid-
ering the high level of coordination required. Another way of using collabora-
tion ties is to use them over time. When one develops an activity and meets 
new recruitments needs, one can pick among former colleagues or business 
relations, a person one knows as a good productive match.  
Therefore these elements lead us to build two new hypotheses, strongly 
related to one another.  
H2a: When people change job, moveable key assets and collaboration ties are highly cor-
related. 
Although it will be difficult to test in this paper, we do think that the corre-
lation given in H2a is the product of dynamic causal system. Holding movable 
key assets at time t leads you to develop collaboration ties at time t+1 in order 
to achieve a more complete appropriation of the assets. The reverse relation is 
also true. When you have collaboration ties with coworkers at time t, you will 
increase also in t+1 the key assets you can move, since the type of social capital 
we are coining may be seen as a multiplier of assets (Bourdieu, 1986, Lin, 
2001). To the assets you hold, may be added the assets hold by some of your 
collaboration ties. 
The strong correlation we hypothesize between moveable key assets and 
collaboration ties has a simple consequence. The factors that cause the former, 
that is working in core finance (H1), cause also the later and we expect for this 
reason moveable key assets and collaboration ties to be correlated. But we 
think also that working in core finance favors also by itself the building and the 
use of collaboration ties on the financial labor market. One reason is that the 
strong autonomy and high specialization in core finance, favors the creation of 
united team ready for defection. On the contrary in the support departments a 
lower level of specialization and, as in some Law firms (Lazega, 2001), policies 
                                                 
2 “Inside Frank Quattrone money Machine”, Business Week, October 13th 2003. 
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of internal mobility from department to another prevent the formation such 
teams. So for those two reasons, we can expect the following relation:  
H2b: Working in core finance favors the use of collaboration ties. 
Enjoying the double power of moving assets and people through collabora-
tion ties, is highly valuable on the labor market since it enables to get higher 
wages. In our previous work (Godechot, 2008a) we characterize this phe-
nomenon with the neo-williamsonian concept of hold-up (Williamson, 1985 ; 
Malcomson, 1997). We rely on a detailed case study where a head of equity 
derivative trading room and his deputy were respectively granted 10 and 7 
million euros of bonus for the year 2000. The year before, those two heads had 
resigned and given 48 hours to their bank in order to match the offer of a rival 
bank granting them with a very high proportion of the bonus pool (15% for 
the two). They were explicitly threatening their bank that if it did not match the 
rival offer, they would move their teams very shortly to the rival bank. Finally, 
under urgent pressure, the bank applied the conditions of the rival bank, which 
led the two, at the end of a great year on the market, to earn such unusual 
bonuses (Godechot, 2008a). In this case, the price paid is not just the usual 
price of a market bidding process for individual talent. We are not here in a 
situation where people take out from a job no more than what they brought in. 
Here the price paid is that of the assets they are able to move from one firm to 
another through collaboration ties, assets that were paid through the invest-
ment of a whole community (shareholder, workers) but that are appropriated 
and moved by a few. This element of opportunism and unequal exchange 
allows us therefore to conceptualize this exchange more as hold-up (although 
legal here) than as a classic market bid.  
In this case of successful renegotiation, as in many other case of successful 
collective departure, we have a combination of movable assets and collabora-
tion ties. This combination enables workers to earn an important wage pre-
mium that according to us accounts for most of the wage differential puzzle 
between various jobs in finance and moreover between Wall Street and Main 
Street (Philippon, Resheff, 2009 ; Kaplan, Rauh, 2009). Moreover if we follow 
Groysberg et alii. (2008) results, firms that are trying to poach teams are very 
often overestimating the assets the teams are moving, and are overbidding in 
order to get the whole. The two arguments, assets moving through collabora-
tion ties and overbidding go for the financial operative who moves in the same 
direction, it raises the wage and can be merged into a strong correlation be-
tween the expectation of the assets moved through collaboration ties and 
salaries. We will sum up our argument by this simple proposition: 
H3: Move of key assets, collaboration ties and more over the combination of those two 
dimensions increases wages.  
3. An internet questionnaire on mobility in French 
financial industry 
The questionnaire 
The survey is based on a collaboration between the author and efinancialca-
reers.fr, the French branch of efinancialcareers.com, a popular website devoted to 
job classified advertisements in financial industry. The website has developed 
also into a financial media website in order to attract both firms who pay for 
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the ads and employee that may be interested by those announcements. The 
basis of this fruitful collaboration was that I could benefit of their wide audi-
ence in the financial industry in order to get an important number of answers 
and that they could on the other hand use the questionnaire both as a market-
ing tool in order to promote the website and as a source to feed their informa-
tion part of the website with the first results (Godechot 2008c, 2008d). 
The questionnaire built during summer 2008 is divided into three parts. The 
first twenty questions are devoted to the description of the last move in finance 
for those who changed job at least once in financial industry. The next 12 
questions describe wishes of mobility, but only for those that had never 
changed job in financial industry3. The questions for the wishes of mobility are 
formulated in very similar terms to those concerning the past mobility. And the 
last 12 questions are general socioeconomic questions asked to the whole 
sample about the social background and the present situation in the financial 
industry.  
The questionnaire was by coincidence launched on the website on Septem-
ber, 16th 2008, just the day after Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, and was 
closed on October, 7th 2008 in the midst of the financial turmoil. Although a 
few final comments made visible people’s concern about this special situation, 
the latter did not seem to affect that much the answers: first the questionnaire, 
in French, received mainly answers from people working in France or for 
French firms and apart in the subprime sector, financial crisis became only 
profound during late fall; second, our questions, focusing on the last mobility, 
would collect information merely on the year 2006, 2007 and the beginning of 
2008, a period where French finance was either flourishing or, apart from the 
subprime sector, only slowly entering into crisis. The questionnaire was both 
made visible for persons visiting the website and sent by efinancialcareers.fr to 
their registered contacts. Based on the dates and times of answers, we think 
that one half to two thirds of the questionnaires were filed by persons invited 
to do so thanks to their two mailings. 
With 995 answers to the first question, the questionnaire, emphasizing its 
scientific goal, was according to efinancialcareers.fr a success when compared to 
the quick questionnaires they do from time to time. This flattering appreciation 
shows also the relevance of the questions. But doing rather long questionnaires 
on internet (maybe 10-15 minutes) has a backside: we see a rather important 
attrition effect. After the first question on the number of job changes in 
finance, 22% of the sample stopped answering. Only 66% of the 995 went to 
the end of the poll. Therefore we can rely on 454 complete and 78 incomplete 
questionnaires for those who did change job, and 209 complete and 28 incom-
plete questionnaires for those who never changed job. 
Due to the fact that there is no random sampling here, it is important to 
know to what extent our data is representative of financial industry beyond the 
fact we can expect that it represents merely the visitors of efinancialcareers.fr. 
The respondents are mainly working in Paris (66%), 12% work in the rest of 
                                                 
3 Although it would have been a better methodology to ask the questions on mobility wishes to 
the full sample, efinancialcareers.fr was very concerned that the questionnaire would therefore 
become too long for an internet survey. As we will see further, this concern was wise. There-
fore, it must be noted, that when we work on the wishes of mobility, there might be a selection 
bias due to the fact it is the mobility wishes of those who never moved (and who therefore are 
maybe less inclined to move). 
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France, 5% in London, 5% in the rest of Europe, the rest elsewhere. They 
work mainly in banks (47%), in other financial firms (asset management, 
broker) (16%), or in insurance firms (4%). 22% work in a business that serves 
financial industry such as law, consulting or IT firms and 10% among other 
types of firms. 
The comparison with data from a leading bank that we were able to gather 
during our fieldwork (Godechot, 2007) shows that our sample is a rather good 
representation of financial industry at large (table 1). We must not forget that 
for a famous trader and a sales in the front office, we must count 4 or 5 other 
employee working in various support positions. We do find some differences 
between our data and that of 2000 bank but they are limited to back and 
middle office on the one hand and accounting, budgeting and audit in the 
other hand, domains where the nominative differences are rather fuzzy. 
Table 1. Comparison between our sample and the job composition of the 
investment bank of a French leading bank in 2000 
Function 
Our 2008 
sample  
(n=663) 
Investment 
bank 
2000 
(n=3800) 
Trading and portfolio management 9.8% 8.3% 
Marketing and sales 10.7% 8.0% 
Financial engineering 7.2% 7.6% 
Information and technology 8.3% 8.6% 
Research and financial analysis 10.7% 5.5% 
Back and middle-office 9.4% 25.4% 
Accounting, budgeting, audit 22.9% 7.0% 
Law and compliance 2.4% 0.5% 
Other 17.2% 29.9% 
No answer 1.4%  
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
Notes: 9.8% of the 663 respondents were working in trading or portfolio management 
functions. This figure is pretty close to the 8,3% working in trading functions in 2000 in an 
important French investment bank. Comparison data were gathered during a fieldwork. 
More, our wages - Q1 = 47,000 euros, median=58,000 euros, Q3 = 83,000, 
P9 =146,000 – are rather similar to the one we can find in Calyon’s 2008 bilan 
social (social report4) : Q1 = 37,770 euros, median=55,243 euros, Q3 = 93,529, 
P9 =171,143. One difference comes for the standard deviation that seems 
lower in our sample. 
The biggest bias of our sample (which that may account for the above dis-
crepancies) is the age bias. In our sample, 7% are under 25, 64% are between 
25 and 34, 19% between 35 and 44 and 9% over 45. At Calyon’s bank, 5% are 
under 25, 29% between 25 and 34, 28% between 35 and 44, and 36% are over 
45. Several reasons may account for those differences. Elderly employee in 
finance might move less, use less IT to look for a job, and may rely more on 
head-hunting or direct contacts to get a job. Therefore it is very likely, that our 
                                                 
4 Calyon – Direction des ressources humaines, 2009, Bilan social 2008, Calyon. Social reports are 
compulsory in French firms over 300 employees and are sent to union delegates, shareholders 
and to Labor inspection services. Workforce in subsidies and moreover foreign subsidies are 
not counted. 
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sample will not permit to scrutinize the most spectacular collective moves 
organized by the more senior employee like such of the heads of trading rooms 
described above. 
Variables 
Movable assets 
Asking questions on key movable assets held by employee is not an easy 
task since the concepts are highly abstract and may sound unfamiliar to the 
respondents and that maybe the employee may not be always conscious that in 
a sense they can appropriate assets off the firm. For this reason, we have tried 
to find a proxy by asking some questions on the elements that were at stake 
during the recruitment process (Table 2).  
Table 2. What was at stake during this recruitment? 
Answers 
 (multiple choice question) 
% 
(n=489) 
Replacing someone 27% 
Reinforcing a team 55% 
Bringing new techniques 21% 
Bringing new clients 7% 
Providing new strategies 11% 
Developing a new business 25% 
Notes: 27% of the 489 respondent that at least changed once job in finance answered replacing 
someone was at stake during their last recruitment.  
We have interpreted the four last answers of this question as a proxy of the 
assets held by the employee. If the issue of the recruitment was to bring 
something “new” to their employer, should it be “new techniques”, “new 
clients”, “new strategies” or a “new business”, it is most likely that those assets 
were based on assets, acquired during the career in finance. It is true that some 
of the elements, like new techniques, could be partly due also to a general, 
knowledge and talent, prior to financial career. But it is very unlikely that talent 
and general knowledge can solely enable someone bringing new strategies, and 
more over new business or new strategies without an on the job accumulation 
of financial experience, and of what we call key movable assets. 
In order to rely on a robust measure of key movable assets, we construct an 
index that would reflect the various dimensions assets moving. We sum 
therefore the four standardized last items, in order for each dimension to have 
the same weight on the overall index. 
Assets0= Tech/sdTech + Clients/sdClients + Strat/sdstrat + Bus/sdBus 
Assets=Assets0/sdAssets0 
Our index is all the more justified that it captures pretty well the structure 
of correlation between the six items of answers. We did a multiple correspon-
dence analysis on the six items of answer and we have plotted as a supplemen-
tary variable our index on Graph 1. 
 12 
Graph 1. Multiple correspondence analysis on asset moving proxies 
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Notes: Multiple correspondence analysis is a technique derived from principle component 
analysis. Half of the variance is represented here. The size of point is proportional to the 
weight of the represented item. 
The Multiple Correspondence Analysis shows a strong opposition between 
the employee who can only replace someone or reinforce a team and those 
who take along new business, new techniques, new strategies or new clients. 
The second axis shows a secondary opposition between replacing and reinforc-
ing and to a lesser extent between bringing clients and bringing strategies. We 
find a strong positive correlation between the first axis of the Multiple Corre-
spondence Analysis and the index that we have been building (r=0,97), and a 
much milder negative correlation between the second axis (r=-0.16). 
Collaboration ties 
In order to measure collaboration ties, we rely mainly on four questions in 
the past mobility questionnaire and on one in the wished mobility. Moving in 
teams, hiring former colleagues and, for those who did not experience any job 
change in finance, being very likely to follow one’s boss are clear examples of 
collaboration ties (Table 3). Those cases reveal situations where people are 
somehow more productive when they work with contacts with whom they are 
used to collaborate than with other colleagues, should they share idiosyncratic 
routines, are more fundamental assets such as knowledge, technology, market 
share or customers. Although our sample is rather biased in favor of junior 
workers, it is impressive and suggestive to see that 14% of those who moved 
had help to hire former colleagues and 15% of them already moved in team. 
Although the collective aspect of financial recruitment is generally limited to 
small numbers (two or three persons team) and that we don’t get the most 
spectacular ones, its importance makes it worth an investigation. 
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Table 3. Ties and collaboration ties 
Questions Items % 
A head hunter contacted me 20% 
An employee of another firm contacted 
me 
18% 
I contacted a head hunter 7% 
I contacted directly a firm 27% 
Who was at the origin of 
the last move? (n=532) 
I replied to a firm 27% 
Former colleagues 22% 
Business partners 13% 
Former classmates 13% 
Friends 8% 
Did you know employees 
in the service where you 
were hired? (n=531) 
Others 15% 
No, I did not try 76% 
I tried with no success 10% 
1 or 2 colleagues 12% 
Once in your new job, did 
you help to hire some 
former colleagues? 
(n=469) 3 and more 2% 
No 85% 
With 1 or 2 colleagues 12% 
When you changed jobs, 
did you ever move with 
other colleagues in an 
another firm? (n=469) 
With 3 and more 3% 
Very likely 15% 
If other members of the team go 2% 
If conditions are interesting enough 66% 
If your boss moves to 
another firm and invites 
you to come along, would 
you follow him or her? 
(n=233) 
No 18% 
Notes: 20% of those who moved were first contacted by a head hunter. The four first ques-
tions were asked to those who experienced a job change and the last one to the person who 
never changed job. 
The question on the contacts informs us also on the types of ties used in 
financial industry in order to get jobs. Professional contacts such as former 
colleagues and business partners are people with whom you have been cooper-
ating with and are therefore more likely classified as collaboration ties. But 
classmates and other contacts on the one hand and friends on the other would 
be rather classified in the Granovetterian dichotomy weak ties – strong ties. 
Also, in the first question, although the link is rather weaker, being first con-
tacted by an employee of the firm might also reveal a use of collaboration ties. 
As previously for assets, we construct an index of collaboration ties as an 
addition of the standardized minimum number of persons involved in a team 
move, the standardized minimum number of the former colleagues hired and 
the number of types of professional contacts known in the service where one 
was hired5. 
                                                 
5 For team moves (Team_move variable), the values are 0 if the respondent never moved in 
team, 1 if he/she moved with one or two other colleagues and 3 if he/she moved with more 
than three colleagues. For hiring colleagues (Hire_coll), the variable is given a value of 0 if the 
respondent did not try to hire former colleagues, 0.5, if he/she tried but with no success, 1 if 
he/she helped to hire 1 or 2 former colleagues, and 3 when he/she helped to hire 3 or more 
former colleagues. The professional contacts (Pro_Cont) has a value of 0 if the respondent did 
not know neither former colleagues nor business partners in the service where he or she was 
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Coll_Ties0= Team_move/sdTeam_move + Hire_coll/sdHire_coll + Pro_Cont/sdPro_Cont 
 
Coll_Ties = Coll_Ties 0/sdColl_Ties0 
As previously, this index, that gives an equal weight to all three elements, is 
representative of the correlation between the variables as we will see in the 
following Multiple Correspondence Analysis. 
Graph 2. Multiple correspondence analysis on collaboration ties 
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The first opposition that emerges from this analysis is between people that 
have many collaboration ties and those who are lacking of such collaboration 
ties. The secondary opposition is between professional and non-professional 
contacts. The index we have constructed is highly correlated with the first 
dimension of the multiple correspondence analysis (r=0.87) and there is a very 
weak negative correlation with the second dimension of the analysis (r=-0.02).  
Combining movable assets and collaboration ties 
We have explored several ways of analyzing the combination of movable 
assets and collaboration ties, such as the addition, the multiplication of our two 
indexes and the first dimension of the multiple correspondence analysis based 
on both asset variables and network variables. On the basis of explanatory 
power, we have chosen the latter solution. But it must be noted that results are 
very similar. 
                                                                                                                            
hired, 1 if he/she did know either former colleagues or business partners, 2 if both types are 
known. 
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Graph 3. Multiple correspondence analysis on collaboration ties and 
movable assets 
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Other variables 
Compensation. Compensation variables are our main dependant variables 
that enable us to see the impact of assets moving and collaboration ties using. 
For those who changed job, we asked first the percentage of wage increase 
obtained during the last mobility. And to all respondents, we asked for their 
present annual fixed wage and bonus. As compensations are a personal infor-
mation that some person might not want to reveal in an internet poll, categori-
cal items were proposed instead of the exact numerical amounts. For the fixed 
wage, categories are the following:  1) < 40 kilo euros a year, 2) 40 to 60, 3) 60 
to 80, 4) 80 to 100, 5) 100 to 150, 6) 150 to 300, 7) more than 300. For the 
variable wage : 1) Less than 10% of the fixed wage, 2) from 10 to 25%, 3) from 
25 % to 50 %, 4) from 50 % to 100%, 5) from 1 to 2 time the annual fixed 
wage, 6) from 2 to 5, 7) more than 5 time. On the basis of those two variables, 
it is possible to calculate the intervals of the total compensation. For instance, 
someone with fixed wage between 40 and 60 000 euros, and a bonus between 
50% and one year of fixed wage has a total compensation between 60 and 
120 000 euros. The full information of this variable may be efficiently handled 
through interval regression.  
Position in financial industry. We used two types of variable in order to de-
scribes the position inside financial industry, first the “function”, described in 
Table 1, and second, a sector question divided in 10 items: 1) Markets: Equity, 
2) Markets: Forex, fixed income & commodities, 3) Merger and acquisition, 4) 
Financing, 5) Private banking, 6) Retail banking, 7) Asset management, 8) 
Private Equity / Venture Capital, 9) Consulting, 10) Insurance, 11) Others. We 
consider that at the core of financial markets we find front office functions 
(Trading and portfolio management, marketing and sales) and the investment 
bank sector (Markets division, M&A, Private Equity) (Godechot 2001).  
Human capital. As financial industry is a sector which is highly intensive in 
human capital (Philippon, Resheff, 2009), it is important to have a detailed 
variable capable of describing the hierarchy of diplomas more subtly than the 
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traditional years of schooling variable (Mincer, 1974). In our survey we asked 
for the diploma that describes best the schooling curriculum. We proposed 9 
items of answer : 1) “Rank A” engineering school, 2) “Rank A” business 
school, 3) French Doctorate, PhD, 4) “Rank B” engineering school, 5) “Rank 
B” business school, 6) French university masters (i.e. “DEA”, “DESS” and 
masters), 7) Foreign university masters, 8) Bachelor (i.e. “Licence, Maîtrise, 
IUT, bachelor”), 9) Two years of college diploma (“Deug, BTS, Bac + 2”) or 
lower rank diploma. This nomenclature is based on the domination of French 
Grandes Écoles (Bourdieu, 1998) over universities and inside financial industry 
on the domination of a small elite of “Rank A” engineering Grandes Écoles such 
as Polytechnique, Mines, Centrale, Ponts, ENSAE for and to a lesser extent 
“Rank A” business schools such as HEC, ESSEC or ESCP (Godechot, 2001).  
We asked when people started in financial industry, so we can therefore 
calculate a financial experience, a form of experience that is better in this sector of 
high turn-over than the usual seniority within firm variable. We use also the 
classical age and sex variable. 
4. Combining assets and people 
Table 4 enables to test both H1 and H2b, that is working at the heart of the 
financial market favors the dual accumulation of key moveable assets and 
collaboration ties. If we were to think that key movable assets and collabora-
tion ties were only a byproduct of human capital, that is talented people are per 
se creative of assets and that they attract many people who are willing to 
collaborate, we would have waited mainly for classical human capital variables 
such as diploma, age and financial experience to be significant and for others 
core finance proxies to have very little explanatory power. It is true that 
diploma, especially top engineering school diplomas, age for moveable assets, 
experience for collaboration ties have an important impact. But the impact of 
working in front office jobs is very significant and almost as important as that 
of an elite engineering diploma. Therefore in order to acquire movable assets 
or collaboration ties, it’s not only a question of initial talent and general experi-
ence but also a matter of where you work.  
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Table 4. Human capital, core finance and the accumulation of moveable 
assets and collaborative ties. 
  
Descriptive 
statistics 
Moveable 
asset 
index 
Collaborative 
ties index 
Combined 
index 
Intercept 
/ -2.46* 
(1.11) 
-0.83 
(1.11) 
-2.74 * 
(1.09) 
Sector: Investment bank 
0.28 
(0.10) 
-0.029 
(0.104) 
0.052 
(0.103) 
0.061 
(0.101) 
Function: Front-office 
0.20 
(0.08) 
0.46*** 
(0.12) 
0.21 * 
(0.12) 
0.43 *** 
(0.12) 
Financial experts (research 
and engineering) 
0.16 
(0.07) 
-0.018 
(0.133) 
-0.22 * 
(0.13) 
-0.062 
(0.13) 
IT 
0.09 
(0.04) 
-0.097 
(0.175) 
0.012 
(0.175) 
0.032 
(0.171) 
Experience in finance (years) 
8.34 
(7.33) 
-0.0066 
(0.0318) 
0.097 ** 
(0.032) 
0.064 * 
(0.031) 
Experience in finance (square 
years) 
123.29 
(212.49) 
0.00046 
(0.00096) 
-0.0021 * 
(0.001) 
-0.0012 
(0.0009) 
Age (years) 
33.27 
(8.24) 
0.14* 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.062) 
0.099 
(0.061) 
Age (square years) 
1175.32 
(632.28) 
-0.0015* 
(0.0008) 
-0.0006 
(0.00078) 
-0.0013 * 
(0.0008) 
Sex: Male 
0.75 
(0.43) 
0.14 
(0.11) 
0.27 * 
(0.11) 
0.31 ** 
(0.1) 
Diploma: Top engineering 
school 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.59* 
(0.23) 
0.43 * 
(0.23) 
0.71 ** 
(0.23) 
Top business school 
0.19 
(0.08) 
0.071 
(0.178) 
0.042 
(0.178) 
0.076 
(0.174) 
French Doctorate, PhD 
0.01 
(0.005) 
0.75 
(0.47) 
1.44 ** 
(0.46) 
1.34 ** 
(0.46) 
Rank b engineering school 
0.06 
(0.03) 
0.29 
(0.25) 
0.18 
(0.25) 
0.41 * 
(0.24) 
Rank b business school 
0.15 
(0.06) 
0.29 
(0.19) 
0.026 
(0.188) 
0.19 
(0.18) 
French Master 
0.33 
(0.11) 
0.11 
(0.16) 
0.13 
(0.16) 
0.15 
(0.16) 
Foreign Master 
0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.29 
(0.35) 
0.36 
(0.35) 
0.24 
(0.34) 
Lower rank diploma and 
missing 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.19 
(0.24) 
0.22 
(0.24) 
0.49 * 
(0.24) 
R2 / 12% 15% 18% 
N 441 441 441 441 
Notes: The first column contains means and standard deviations of explanatory variables. All 
models are OLS regression. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *p <0.1, **p <0.01, ***p 
<0.001 (two tailed tests). The reference categories for sector, function, sex and diploma are 
respectively other sector, back-office, support and other functions, female and bachelor 
diploma. 
Table 5 enables us to explore with more details the link between the situa-
tion in financial industry and the type of ties involved. Knowing former 
colleagues, moving in team, and being first contacted by someone in the firm is 
highly linked with working in front-office, and for the latter also working the 
investment bank. Although the sample is quite limited for the people who 
never moved and who were asked about there wished mobility, it is striking to 
see that being very likely to follow a moving boss is also correlated with a 
position in the investment bank. Hiring former colleagues seems a little less 
specific to financial market core. It is mainly due to financial experience, and 
seems as common in font-office, IT and support functions but much less 
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developed in financial expertise functions. This may be due to a work organiza-
tion in those functions that emphasize more individual expertise than team 
work.  
It is also interesting to contrast collaborative ties with other types of ties. 
We can see that non-professional contacts such as friends, classmates and 
“other contacts” are not used by the same persons than collaborative ties. 
Those types of ties are more effective outside investment banks than at its 
heart. The argument is not to say that financial people have per se a different 
nature of sociability that makes them more indifferent to traditional friendship 
and university ties. It is more to recall that being in a sector where the key of 
success is to appropriate, value and move key assets that may be shared among 
several partners, leads to use more collaboration ties over other types of ties 
which they may also have. 
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Table 5. Details about collaborative ties 
  
Professional 
Contacts 
Move in 
team 
Hire 
colleagues 
Contacted 
by s.o. in 
the firm 
Follow 
the boss 
Non 
profes-
sional 
contacts 
Intercept 
-1.05* 
(0.61) 
-0.45 
(0.66) 
0.53 
(0.61) 
-6.1* 
(3.51) 
-15.8* 
(8.18) 
1.34* 
(0.67) 
Sector: Investment bank 
0.076 
(0.057) 
-0.0073 
(0.061) 
-0.013 
(0.057) 
0.84** 
(0.28) 
1.54** 
(0.52) 
-0.17** 
(0.06) 
Function: Front-office 
0.13* 
(0.07) 
0.13 * 
(0.07) 
-0.012 
(0.066) 
0.61* 
(0.33) 
-0.6 
(0.64) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
Financial experts 
0.036 
(0.073) 
-0.022 
(0.078) 
-0.25 *** 
(0.07) 
0.54 
(0.37) 
0.51 
(0.53) 
-0.031 
(0.08) 
IT 
0.011 
(0.097) 
0.06 
(0.103) 
-0.05 
(0.096) 
-0.043 
(0.496) 
-1.24 
(1.21) 
0.017 
(0.105) 
Experience in finance 
(years) 
0.033* 
(0.018) 
0.027 
(0.019) 
0.05 ** 
(0.017) 
-0.039 
(0.091) 
-0.014 
(0.149) 
0.016 
(0.019) 
Experience in finance 
(square years) 
-0.0008 
(0.00053) 
-0.00058 
(0.00057) 
-0.001 * 
(0.0005) 
0.002 
(0.0027) 
0.0038 
(0.0072) 
-0.00064 
(0.00058) 
Age 
(years) 
0.053 
(0.034) 
0.024 
(0.037) 
-0.03 
(0.034) 
0.2 
(0.2) 
0.73 
(0.5) 
-0.059 
(0.038) 
Age 
(square years) 
-0.00063 
(0.00043) 
-0.00038 
(0.00046) 
0.0003 
(0.00043) 
-0.0023 
(0.0025) 
-0.01 
(0.008) 
0.00065 
(0.00047) 
Sex: Male 
0.1* 
(0.06) 
0.098 
(0.063) 
0.11 * 
(0.06) 
0.38 
(0.33) 
0.18 
(0.51) 
0.1 
(0.064) 
Diploma: Top engineering 
school 
0.29* 
(0.13) 
0.12 
(0.14) 
0.075 
(0.128) 
0.59 
(0.6) 
2.58* 
(1.07) 
0.26* 
(0.14) 
Top business school 
0.029 
(0.098) 
-0.038 
(0.105) 
0.051 
(0.098) 
-0.4 
(0.54) 
0.93 
(1.04) 
0.13 
(0.11) 
French Doctorate, PhD 
0.68** 
(0.26) 
0.33 
(0.28) 
0.61 * 
(0.26) 
0.15 
(1.26) 
2.92* 
(1.71) 
0.055 
(0.28) 
Rank b engineering school 
0.19 
(0.14) 
-0.0025 
(0.1457) 
0.017 
(0.136) 
0.48 
(0.65) 
0.3 
(1.45) 
0.27* 
(0.15) 
Rank b business school 
0.11 
(0.1) 
-0.0063 
(0.1115) 
-0.07 
(0.104) 
-0.59 
(0.59) 
0.76 
(1.01) 
0.13 
(0.11) 
French Master 
0.034 
(0.088) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
0.012 
(0.088) 
0.13 
(0.45) 
0.91 
(0.91) 
0.061 
(0.096) 
Foreign Master 
0.14 
(0.19) 
-0.017 
(0.207) 
0.27 
(0.19) 
1.04 
(0.85) 
-15.31 
(1161) 
-0.079 
(0.211) 
Lower rank diploma and 
missing 
0.24* 
(0.13) 
0.065 
(0.143) 
-0.054 
(0.133) 
0.65 
(0.62) 
1.08 
(1.04) 
0.34* 
(0.15) 
R2 13% 5% 11% (Logit) (Logit) 7% 
N 442 441 441 442 196 442 
Notes: The first three columns and the last one are OLS regression with respectively the 
following dependant variables, number of types of professional colleagues, minimum number 
of person that moved along, the minimum number of former colleagues hired, number of 
types of non-professional contacts. The column 4 and 5 are logistic regression modeling the 
probability of having been first contacted by someone in the firm and the probability of being 
very likely to follow one’s boss if the latter moves and invites you to do so. This last regression 
concern only people that did not move in financial industry. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
*p <0.1, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001 (two tailed tests). The reference categories for sector, 
function, sex and diploma are respectively other sector, back-office, support and other 
functions, female and bachelor diploma. 
Globally, the analysis of table 4 and 5 confirms well the link, stated in hy-
pothesis 1 et 2b, between working in core finance and accumulating key assets 
on the one hand, collaboration ties on the other. Holding moveable key assets 
and collaborations ties seem by the way pretty correlated. First, the multiple 
correspondence analysis (Graph 3) did show the overall correlation between 
the items of the first argument and that of the second, that are all on the same 
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side of the first axis. Is this global correlation due to the similarity of the causes 
of our two concepts shown by table 4? Or is it more profound?  
Table 6. Complete and partial correlation between moveable assets and 
various measures of collaboration ties 
Correlation of moveable assets index with :  
Global 
correlation 
Predicted 
variables 
correlation 
Residual 
correlation 
Collaboration ties index 
0.30*** 
(6.88) 
0.76*** 
(24.86) 
0.22*** 
(4.78) 
Professional Contacts 
0.22*** 
(5.08) 
0.82*** 
(30.71) 
0.14** 
(2.96) 
Move in team 
0.12** 
(2.71) 
0.69*** 
(20.00) 
0.08* 
(1.66) 
Hire colleagues 
0.27*** 
(5.97) 
0.47*** 
(11.40) 
0.22*** 
(4.81) 
Non professional contacts 
0.10* 
(2.13) 
-0.04 
(-0.85) 
0.12* 
(2.55) 
Notes: Pearson correlation coefficients are computed, and the nullity of correlation is tested. 
Student’s T statistics are in parenthesis. *p <0.1, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001 (two tailed tests). The 
global correlation between the moveable asset index and the collaborative ties index is 0.30. 
The correlation of their prediction calculated regressions (table 4 and 5) with the same 
explanatory variables is 0.76. The correlation of their residuals, also called partial correlation 
coefficient, is 0.22. 
Table 6 suggests that moveable assets and collaboration ties are strongly 
correlated not only because of the high similarity of their prediction based on 
the same set of variables, but also beyond by the correlation of their residuals6. 
The partial correlation of 0.22 indicates that when one of the two variable 
moves by one standard deviation, the other moves by a little more than a fifth 
of a standard deviation7. The importance and the significance of the three 
correlations hold when we turn to the relation between moveable assets and 
different types of collaboration ties. It is interesting to note that the correlation 
of moveable assets with non-professionnal contacts, although positive and 
significant, is much lower that with collaboration ties. Those results show 
therefore that our proposition of a strong correlation between collaboration 
ties and moveable assets is clearly proved. Therefore, when you share assets 
with a coworker, it is worth collaborating with him to valuate those assets, and 
reversely when you collaborate with someone, you end up holding a greater 
amount of assets. 
What is the impact of this double accumulation on compensation? In table 
7, we analyze the impact of our two indexes, first on the pay rise (in percent-
age) obtained during the last move, and finally on the total compensation at the 
time of the survey.  
                                                 
6 There is a linear relation between the three columns of the table :   
cor(y,z)=(Ry2,Rz2)0.5 * cor(yp,zp)+ (1-Ry2,1-Rz2)0.5 * cor(uy, uz) with yp and zp the prediction of y 
and z based on the same set of variables x1 … xk, uy and uz their residuals, and Ry2 and Rz2 their 
R square. 
7 It must be noted that adding one of the two variables as an explanatory variable of the other 
in the regressions printed in table 4 would lead to the same result both in terms of coefficient 
(with standardized variables) and in terms of statistical significance. But since we think that we 
can expect simultaneity and reciprocal determination between the two variable, we thought it 
would be more correct to use partial correlation than a regression, that could be misleading, if 
it is interpreted in the usual unilateral causal manner. 
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The average pay rise obtained during last move is 25%. Modeling this in-
crease is rather difficult. One reason is that pay rise in percentage may be quite 
a heterogeneous phenomenon: some may be important because the incum-
bents had a strong position on the market, for instance holding key assets and 
many collaboration ties, others may be important only because the incumbents 
had previously a very little wage. Therefore, traditional variables of wage 
equations such as age, experience and diploma do not seem to play a signifi-
cant role. Nevertheless the position in financial industry plays rather an impor-
tant role, moving in (or to) investment bank increase the pay rise by 10 
percentage points, and working in front office increases also by 4 or 5 points, a 
deviation that is not significantly different from that of support functions, but 
that differ significantly from IT jobs. A standard deviation variation of the 
collaborative ties index increases the pay rise by nearly 2 points. But our 
variable is not very significant (p=0.16). A standard deviation of our asset 
moving index has here a stronger and much more significant effect (+3 
points). Combining collaborative ties and asset moving, measured by our 
combined index, has even a stronger effect (+ 3.3 points). 
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Table 7. Effects of moveable assets and collaboration ties on compensa-
tion 
  
Pay rise during last move (in percentage) Total compensation 
(log of intervals) 
Intercept 
36.45 
(28.09) 
42.58 
(28.09) 
42.91 
(28.1) 
44.15 
(28.12) 
1.07* 
(0.6) 
1.06* 
(0.6) 
1.13* 
(0.6) 
0.43  
(0.67) 
Collaborative ties index 
1.76 
(1.23) 
 
1.12 
(1.26) 
 
0.091*** 
(0.025) 
 
0.084** 
(0.026) 
 
Moveable asset index 
 
3.09* 
(1.22) 
2.84* 
(1.25) 
  
0.054* 
(0.026) 
0.035 
(0.026) 
 
Combined index 
   
3.34** 
(1.25) 
   
0.091** 
(0.03) 
Sector: Investment bank 
9.61*** 
(2.61) 
9.79*** 
(2.6) 
9.73*** 
(2.6) 
9.5*** 
(2.6) 
0.22*** 
(0.05) 
0.23*** 
(0.05) 
0.23*** 
(0.05) 
0.24*** 
(0.06) 
Function: Front 
4.88 
(3.06) 
3.81 
(3.08) 
3.69 
(3.09) 
3.8 
(3.08) 
0.14* 
(0.06) 
0.14* 
(0.07) 
0.13* 
(0.06) 
0.16* 
(0.07) 
Financial experts 
-2.35 
(3.36) 
-2.68 
(3.34) 
-2.44 
(3.35) 
-2.53 
(3.33) 
0.090 
(0.070) 
0.073 
(0.071) 
0.089 
(0.07) 
0.1 
(0.08) 
IT 
-8.56* 
(4.43) 
-8.24* 
(4.41) 
-8.28* 
(4.41) 
-8.65* 
(4.4) 
-0.066 
(0.091) 
-0.058 
(0.092) 
-0.063 
(0.091) 
0.018 
(0.099) 
Experience in finance 
(years) 
0.33 
(0.81) 
0.53 
(0.8) 
0.42 
(0.81) 
0.29 
(0.8) 
0.060*** 
(0.018) 
0.067*** 
(0.018) 
0.06*** 
(0.018) 
0.062** 
(0.02) 
Experience in finance 
(square years) 
-0.009 
(0.0245) 
-0.014 
(0.024) 
-0.012 
(0.024) 
-0.0088 
(0.0242) 
-0.0013* 
(0.0005) 
-0.0014** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0013* 
(0.0005) 
-0.0015* 
(0.0006) 
Age (years) 
-0.75 
(1.58) 
-1.11 
(1.58) 
-1.12 
(1.58) 
-1.01 
(1.57) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
0.12*** 
(0.03) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
Age (square years) 
0.0056 
(0.0198) 
0.0093 
(0.0198) 
0.0096 
(0.0198) 
0.0088 
(0.0197) 
-0.0014** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0014** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0013** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0018*** 
(0.0005) 
Sex: Male 
1.56 
(2.71) 
1.62 
(2.68) 
1.34 
(2.7) 
1.02 
(2.7) 
0.13* 
(0.06) 
0.15* 
(0.06) 
0.13* 
(0.06) 
0.13* 
(0.07) 
Diploma: Top engineer-
ing school 
3.33 
(5.91) 
2.26 
(5.9) 
1.92 
(5.91) 
1.71 
(5.92) 
0.75*** 
(0.12) 
0.76*** 
(0.13) 
0.73*** 
(0.12) 
0.86*** 
(0.14) 
Top business school 
5.16 
(4.5) 
5.02 
(4.48) 
4.99 
(4.48) 
4.98 
(4.48) 
0.46*** 
(0.09) 
0.46*** 
(0.09) 
0.45*** 
(0.09) 
0.51*** 
(0.1) 
French Doctorate, PhD 
2.24 
(11.92) 
2.44 
(11.76) 
1.02 
(11.87) 
0.31 
(11.83) 
0.35 
(0.27) 
0.43 
(0.27) 
0.33 
(0.27) 
0.33 
(0.32) 
Rank b engineering 
school 
-5.2 
(6.24) 
-5.79 
(6.21) 
-5.92 
(6.22) 
-6.25 
(6.22) 
0.39** 
(0.13) 
0.39** 
(0.13) 
0.38** 
(0.13) 
0.31* 
(0.14) 
Rank b business school 
-0.53 
(4.77) 
-1.39 
(4.76) 
-1.35 
(4.76) 
-1.11 
(4.75) 
0.23* 
(0.1) 
0.22* 
(0.1) 
0.22* 
(0.1) 
0.28* 
(0.11) 
French Master 
0.99 
(4.04) 
0.87 
(4.02) 
0.76 
(4.02) 
0.70 
(4.01) 
0.21* 
(0.08) 
0.22* 
(0.09) 
0.20* 
(0.08) 
0.24* 
(0.1) 
Foreign Master 
-4.88 
(8.86) 
-3.36 
(8.81) 
-3.83 
(8.83) 
-5.03 
(8.8) 
0.13 
(0.18) 
0.18 
(0.19) 
0.14 
(0.18) 
0.16  
(0.2) 
Lower rank diploma and 
missing 
-7.51 
(6.11) 
-7.7 
(6.08) 
-7.89 
(6.08) 
-8.76 
(6.1) 
-0.099 
(0.134) 
-0.071 
(0.134) 
-0.10 
(0.133) 
0.63*** 
(0.15) 
Log scale 
/ / / / 
-0.80*** 
(0.04) 
-0.79*** 
(0.04) 
-0.80*** 
(0.04) 
-0.71 *** 
(0.04) 
R2 9% 10% 10% 10% / / / / 
N 441 441 441 441 429 429 429 429 
Notes: We model in the first four columns the percentage of compensation increase during last 
move with OLS regressions. We model in the last four columns the logarithm of present 
compensation with interval regression. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *p <0.1, **p <0.01, 
***p <0.001 (two tailed tests). The reference categories for sector, function, sex and diploma 
are respectively other sector, back-office, support and other functions, female and bachelor 
diploma. 
Analyzing the logarithm of total compensation gives more classical results 
similar to many wage equations estimations (Mincer, 1974). Although it is not 
possible to calculate a classical R2 with interval regressions, we expect our 
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model to do a rather good job. Running the same estimation on the logarithm 
of either side of our interval gives a R2 of 37-38%. As usual in wage equations, 
human capital, especially with our detailed grid of French diplomas, age and 
experience have a high explanatory power. Top engineering schools have a 
salary twice more important than bachelors (exp(0.75)). But those human 
capital equations do not explain all the variance. Working in front office 
functions and moreover in investment gives a wage rent respectively of 14% 
and 25%. Finally our index of collaborative ties has a strong and significant 
impact on wage. A standard deviation in collaboration ties raise wage by 9%. 
The moveable asset index has a slightly lower impact, but worth noticing, 5%. 
Measuring simultaneously the effect of the two variables show rather similar 
figures and show the fact that collaboration ties have a rather long term 
impact8. Our combined index, has a global impact rather strong, but rather 
similar to that of collaboration ties index alone.  
Finally table 8 enables us to see the different dimensions of collaboration 
ties. We find the same difficulty to explain with various form collaboration ties 
the instantaneous pay rise. Some variables are nevertheless nearly significant 
(p=0.11): helping to hire one former colleague increase by 3.5 points the pay 
rise. Similarly, among those who never moved, those who are ready to follow 
their boss expect a of 6.7 points higher than others.  
Table 8. Types of collaboration ties and compensation 
Models Network variables 
Pay rise during 
last move 
Total compen-
sation (log of 
intervals) 
Number of types of professional 
contacts 
1.8 
(2.23) 
0.17*** 
(0.05) 
a) 
Number of types of non profes-
sional contacts 
2.59 
(2.05) 
0.013 
(0.042) 
b) 
 
Move in team 0.8  
(2.09)  
0.058 
(0.043) 
c) 
Hire colleagues 3.52  
(2.23)  
0.094 * 
(0.046)  
d) 
Follow the boss** 6.70 
(4.26) 
0.25 * 
(0.10) 
Notes: We model the impact of different types of relations on pay rise  and on total compensa-
tion. All 8 models contain the following control variables: sector, function, experience in 
finance, age, sex and diploma. We model the percentage of compensation increase during last 
move with OLS regressions. We model the logarithm of present compensation with interval 
regression. The two models in the last line concern people that have never moved. The pay rise 
is therefore the expected pay rise. The independent variable is the fact of being ready to follow 
the boss if the latter moves and invites to join. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *p <0.1, **p 
<0.01, ***p <0.001 (two tailed tests).  
The long term impact of various collaboration ties on pay is much more 
significant. Almost all collaboration ties have a positive and significant impact 
(at 10% significance threshold) on pay. Knowing at least a business partners or 
a former colleague in the hiring team raises pay by 17%. The difference with 
non-professional ties is here striking. Those non-collaborative ties, should they 
be strong (friends) or weak (classmates, others) add hardly nothing. Similarly 
                                                 
8 The fact that our moveable asset index has more a short term impact on wages and the 
collaboration ties has more a long term impact leads us to interpret the correlation between 
moveable assets and collaboration ties this way: the observed moveable assets at the time of 
the mobility determinates collaboration ties at the same moment that in turn determinates the 
unobserved movable assets at the moment of the survey and the level of compensation. 
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compensation increases by 9.5% per former colleague recruited. Among those 
who have never moved, those ready to follow their boss get 25% more.  
Those results globally allow us to think that our last hypothesis, i.e. that 
moveable key assets, collaborative ties and a combination of the latter increase 
wage, is rather well confirmed by our data. If we compare fieldwork analysis 
and statistical survey, one could have waited for a more impressive premium in 
favor of those two closely tied dimensions. This nuance calls for a few re-
marks. First our sample, rather junior, does not enable us to capture the most 
spectacular hold-ups. Second our measure of collaboration ties, and moreover 
of key moveable assets, is far from precise. This classical error in variable leads 
to an attenuation effect that reduce the absolute value of regression parame-
ters. Third the amplitude of the effect is not that little. If hiring a former 
colleague increases wage by 10%, a head a desk hiring his whole team of 10 
persons increases his by 100%, and we can imagine that two head of rooms as 
in our previous example, moving potentially 100 traders and sales could 
multiply their wages by 5.  
5. How assets and collaborative ties smooth mobility. 
In this section, we would like to turn to the consequences of moving assets 
through collaboration ties. Such moves are dangerous for the firm since it 
deprives of key assets that it financed. Since formal hierarchy is not sufficient 
contrary to the claims of the first versions of transaction costs economics 
(Williamson, 1975), we can therefore expect firms, as far as they are conscious 
of this danger, to protect their assets from transfers or hold-ups through 
contractual devices (Williamson, 1985, Edlin & Reichelstein, 1996).  
In order to capture this phenomenon we asked if people were before their 
mobility subject to conditions that could hamper their mobility. 8% said they 
were subject to differed bonuses, 13% to non compete clauses, 10% to long 
notice of departure and 4% to “other” devices. Altogether 28% were subject to 
at least one retainment device, that is 21 % to one device and 7% to two and 
more devices. As transaction costs theory expect, people holding key assets 
and moreover collaboration ties are generally more subject to retainment 
devices than other workers (table 9). This result holds well in particular for 
differed bonuses and long notices of departure, but does not hold for non 
compete clauses. One reason for non compete clauses to be not very common 
at the core of financial markets is that they are not very efficient. In France, as 
in many countries, non compete clauses must not prevent the freedom of 
work. In order to be legally enforceable, they cannot forbid to have the same 
job, their scope must be limited in time and moreover in space. The usual 
space limitation is not broader than for instance of a few French departments. 
Therefore person subject to a non-compete clause in Paris will still be able to 
work with the same assets, the same team and the same customers in London 
where the clauses will not be very effective. 
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Table 9. Assets and team protection through retainment devices 
Model 
specification 
Variables 
Differed 
bonuses 
Non 
compete 
clauses 
Long notice 
of departure 
At least one 
type of 
retainment 
device 
Number of 
types of 
retainment 
device 
a) 
Collaboration 
ties index 
0.41 ** 
(0.15) 
0.078 
(0.15) 
0.35 * 
(0.15) 
0.23 * 
(0.11) 
0.093 ** 
(0.032) 
b) 
Moveable 
asset index 
0.39 * 
(0.16) 
-0.10 
(0.16) 
0.33 * 
(0.15) 
0.18 
(0.11) 
0.066 * 
(0.032) 
Collaboration 
ties index 
0.34 * 
(0.16) 
0.10 
(0.15) 
0.29 * 
(0.15) 
0.20 * 
(0.12) 
0.083 * 
(0.033) 
c) 
Moveable 
asset index 
0.31 * 
(0.16) 
-0.12 
(0.16) 
0.26 * 
(0.16) 
0.14 
(0.12) 
0.048 
(0.033) 
d) 
 
Combined 
index 
0.57 *** 
(0.17) 
0.029 
(0.153) 
0.32 * 
(0.17) 
0.25* 
(0.12) 
0.091** 
(0.032) 
N  441 441 441 441 441 
Notes: All 20 models contain the following control variables: sector, function, experience in 
finance, age, sex and diploma. Standard errors are in parenthesis. In the first four columns, 
logistic regressions are performed while in the last column we use OLS regressions. *p <0.1, 
**p <0.01, ***p <0.001 (two tailed tests).  
Table 9 seems to indicate that firms try to manage the best they can the 
threat of departure by using available contractual devices. Among those 
devices, differed bonuses seem the most efficient. Table 9 shows that this 
device is mostly privileged in order to protect the people holding collaboration 
ties. Moreover if we compare people who moved and people who did not 
move, we can see that the later are twice more subject to differed bonus than 
the former (16% against 8%), a differential that turn to three times in a logistic 
regression when we control for sector, function, experience in finance, age, sex 
and diploma, suggesting that differed bonus did prevent part of the turn-over9.   
However our survey suggests also that the practical efficiency of those re-
tainment devices are largely challenged by the workers capacity of renegotiating 
their removal. Non compete clauses, long notices of departures and not paying 
differed bonuses to person who resign are not only legally fragile and highly 
susceptible of being broken in a trial but also because, even without any trials 
or threat of trials, firms can accept to exempt the quitting worker of respecting 
the contractual clauses or to finally pay him/her the accumulated differed 
bonuses. Employees are aware of this fragility and of the possible removal of 
those devices through renegotiations. Among the quitting population subject 
to those retainments, 42% renegotiated successfully the removal, 21% renego-
tiated unsuccessfully and 37% did not renegotiate. Among the worker who did 
not move, 40% think that is possible to obtain the removal of the retainment 
devices, 54% find those devices a little annoying but not enough to impeach 
departure, and only 4% thinks that it really inhibits mobility. Long notices of 
departure are quite easy to remove (we estimate that the rate of successful 
removal is 60%) and it is quite common in financial industry to exempt the 
worker to respect his notice of departure once he/she finds a job elsewhere. 
                                                 
9 We must remain cautious in our interpretation. The question on the retainment devices was 
concerning the present job in fall 2008 for employee who never moved and the previous job at 
the time they quitted for those who did move. Information on the differed bonuses for the 
latter is on average three years earlier (on median two years ealier) than that for the former. 
The financial crisis led to discussions on the possible impact of compensation on global 
turmoil and to recommendations in favor of differed bonuses. It is possible that the more 
frequent presence of retainment devices among those who did not move is also the result of 
the recent modification of compensation practices. 
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The firm is often concerned that the resigning workers might be working in 
advance for the interests of his future employer. But non compete clauses and 
differed bonus do not generate that much problems either with 35% of suc-
cessful renegotiation.  
Although persons holding collaboration ties and moveable assets are the 
ones that the firm will try to keep the most through various means, we can 
expect those persons to be the most successful in circumventing retention 
devices. Renegotiation with the firm is not a highly abstract process. It is 
generally a renegotiation with the supervisor and eventually with head of the 
direct supervisor. Someone quitting with assets and collaborative ties is for 
many of his contacts a person worth following in his new firm if ever in a close 
future, worth doing business with in the future, worth collaborating again with 
a few years later thanks to another reconfiguration of industry through turn-
over. Far from being a scapegoat that everyone will try to punish, the asset 
holding quitter is an attractor to whom everybody wants to remain connected.  
Table 10. How collaborative ties smooth transfers on the labor market ? 
Model 
specification Variables 
I. Renegotiate 
successfully 
retainments 
II. Renegotiate 
successfully 
retainments / 
subject to 
retainments 
III. Renegotiate 
successfully 
retainments / 
subject to 
differed 
bonuses or non 
compete 
clauses  
IV. Negotiation 
of a wage 
increase in 
order not to 
quit 
V. Contacts 
played a key 
role / People 
had contact 
VI. Naming 
referrals that 
can testify 
realizations 
VII. Keeping 
good relations 
with former 
colleagues 
a) 
Collaboration ties 
index 
0.24 * 
(0.13) 
0.083 
(0.180) 
0.32 * 
(0.18) 
0.23 * 
(0.12) 
0.27 * 
(0.14) 
0.24 * 
(0.13) 
0.25 * 
(0.12) 
b) 
Moveable asset 
index 
0.27* 
(0.14) 
0.16 
(0.22) 
0.36 * 
(0.21) 
0.54 *** 
(0.12) 
0.17 
(0.15) 
0.28 * 
(0.13) 
0.17 
(0.11) 
Collaboration ties 
index 
0.19 
(0.14) 
0.053 
(0.185) 
0.19 
(0.21) 
0.11 
(0.12) 
0.25 * 
(0.15) 
0.20 
(0.13) 
0.22 * 
(0.12) 
c) 
Moveable asset 
index 
0.22 
(0.14) 
0.15 
(0.23) 
0.41 
(0.27) 
0.52 *** 
(0.12) 
0.12 
(0.15) 
0.25 * 
(0.13) 
0.13 
(0.11) 
d) 
 Combined index 
0.38 ** 
(0.15) 
0.26 
(0.22) 
0.49 * 
(0.22) 
0.43 *** 
(0.12) 
0.56 ** 
(0.17) 
0.36 ** 
(0.13) 
0.32 ** 
(0.12) 
N  441 129 92 441 242 441 441 
Notes: All 32 models contain the following control variables: sector, function, experience in finance, age, sex and diploma except the four models in column 3 that are estimated 
with no control variables. All models are logistic regressions. Standard errors are in parenthesis. *p <0.1, **p <0.01, ***p <0.001 (two tailed tests). 
 In the first three columns of table 10, we estimate the impact of collabora-
tion ties and of moveable assets on the probability of renegotiating successfully 
the removal of retainment devices. Holding collaboration ties or moveable 
assets or moreover a combination of thereof increase the probability of suc-
cess. As we do the regression on the full mobile sample and not conditionally 
on the subjection to retainment devices, one can suspect that we capture only 
the probability of being subject to retainment devices. This is not only the case 
since the regression parameters are higher and more significant than in table 9. 
More, when we estimate a regression on the probability of not renegotiating or 
having no success renegotiating on the same sample the parameters for move-
able assets and collaborations ties are very close to zero and not significant at 
all. In the second column we do the same regression but only on the sample of 
people subject to retainment devices. The parameters are positive, but proba-
bly due to the small size of the sample (n=129) and the important number of 
control variables (k=17), parameters are not significant. It is worth noting that 
without those control variables, correlation between succesfull renegotiation 
and our indexes of collaboration ties and of moveable assets is positive and 
significant (regressions III, table 10).  
Removing retainment is not the only way of smoothing transfers that hold-
ing moveable assets and collaboration ties permits. They enable staying in the 
same firm with a better wage if perchance the job change fails or does not 
seem enough profitable. Column IV shows that holding collaboration ties and 
moreover moveable assets favors wage renegotiation in the firm in order to 
avoid resignation. Being an attractor leads many people to help you in order to 
benefit of your collaboration or of the assets you carry with you. Column V 
shows that in such cases, contacts in the new firm are really willing to help to 
hire and play a key role. It is also much easier to name some referrals that can  
testify one’s realizations during the hiring process (regressions VI, table 10), 
both because, thanks to collaboration ties, referrals are easier to propose, and 
because referrals are probably more inclined to support the recruitment 
through their testimony in order to remain in contact with the quitting finan-
cial worker. Although those mobilities might hurt the team and the firm left, 
people leaving with assets and collaboration ties do not suffer from any kind of 
informal punishment or social exclusion. On the contrary, they keep more 
often than other quitters good relations with the colleagues they leave, since 
those good relations are crucial for both sides in order either to follow the 
quitter or to bring to the new firm colleagues left behind (column VII).  
6. Concluding remarks 
We have shown that within financial industry, position at the core of finan-
cial market leads to a double accumulation of moveable assets and collabora-
tion ties and that those two factors, dynamically reinforcing one another, 
contribute to successful job moves and to higher salaries. Those factors 
contribute to solve part of the wage puzzle in financial industry. Moreover, 
while the firm tries to protect against dangerous departure through contractual 
devices, persons holding collaboration ties and moveable assets are successful 
at withdrawing those limitations. This statistical demonstration knows some 
limitations. As in many studies, we did not identify any evident exogenous 
instrumental variable, and our result can still be due to some unobserved 
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heterogeneity. Nevertheless, although empirical demonstration is not perfect 
and that it needs further work, confirmation of our results even when we 
control for a detail human capital nomenclature and for position within the 
firm pleads in favor of the robustness of our argument. Finally our demonstra-
tion offers two perspectives. First, we would like to discuss the way we should 
view firms and market in financial market. Second, we will see how collabora-
tion ties relate to literature on social network.  
In financial industry, mobile workers that quit the firm in order to start to 
work for a competitor enjoy a rather unusual fate. In a war situation, someone 
doing so would be considered as a traitor and would risk the death row. In a 
political situation, switching from party to another may be seen as a mere sign 
of opportunism and remains suspect. In traditional oligopolistic industry, 
quitting for a competitor may not be officially condemned, but whispers can 
spurt in the abandoned firm about the lack of loyalty of the quitter. Here the 
situation is different. The mobile, holding moveable assets and collaborative 
ties, far from being condemned, is an attractor that his environment is willing 
to help, either to follow him/her quickly or to remain in contact with, with the 
hope of eventual future collaborations. Our case study of mobility in financial 
industry is a prolongation of Boltanski and Chiapello’s characterization of 
exploitation in a network world. They coin analytically this concept as a rever-
sal of the classical redistribution formula the fortune of the great men makes the 
fortune of the little people that prevails in polities ruled by rules of justice. Exploita-
tion are situation where the misfortune of the little people makes the fortune of the great 
men (Boltanski, Chiapello, 2006: 375). In a network world, the mobile exploit 
the immobile in a sense that some people’s immobility is necessary for other’s people 
mobility (ibidem: 362). A mobile acquirers this position by threatening the 
immobile of moving or disconnecting them and maneuvers in a way that the 
immobile will serve him/her. We have here a similar situation where the 
immobile, for instance people in the support departments, will contribute to 
the assets that the most mobile appropriate and move elsewhere, and in order 
try to remain connected to the mobile will serve their interest even in the 
mobility episode. What completes here usefully Boltanski and Chiapello is here 
to document how mobility, collaboration ties, assets are linked and produces 
such inequalities. Hence, exploitation in network world is not orthogonal to 
the issue of property as they claim in their argument, as long as we can con-
sider mobile property, such as social and technical moveable assets.  
The importance of turn-over and attractiveness of the mobile challenges 
also our view of the firm and of competition. Since mobile can move a bundle 
of assets and people and deprive the firm and the stakeholders of an important 
fraction of the capital, this obliges us to reconsider the frontier of the firm 
(Zingales, 2000). Shareholders do not really own the firm as they own classical 
industrial firms. It is not only human capital that falls out of their perimeter as 
explained by Zingales, but moreover social capital, with its multiplicative 
capacity to bundle through collaboration ties all sorts of assets as knowledge, 
know-how, software, customers. Not only the firms do not belong totally to 
their shareholder but we should also reconsider their locus. Firs, we can 
identify the teams moving from one firm to another as the real microfirms. 
More, considering the intensity of turn-over and the fact that the frontier of a 
team remains fuzzy and is renewed by past or new collaborations across firms, 
we might see the real firm between nominal firms in the networks of past and 
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present collaboration ties that can at any time coagulate into a new productive 
team. This direction challenges our vision of competition on the market. A 
universe where one competitor is a former colleague that may also become a 
future colleague or more a future supervisor is likely to be less competitive 
than a universe where clearly separated rivals compete. Although financial 
competition for chances of exchange remains stark, several studies find evi-
dence that competition on prices is somehow tempered (Christie, Schultz, 
1994), and this has probably to do with the network of collaboration ties. The 
study of this later phenomenon could therefore help to explain part of the rent 
of the financial industry. 
But collaboration ties are not only important for the study of the financial 
industry, they are relevant in other sectors. We can expect their role to increase 
with the cooperative nature of work and its idiosyncratic nature and with 
moveable assets at stake. Therefore those relations will play a role in sectors 
that are not well protected by enforceable property rights or by patents, 
especially in service to business. Although work contacts may still be viewed as 
informational weak ties or motivated and influential strong ties, and help to 
find a job without being personally involved in some kind of pursuit of past 
collaboration, it is likely that part of the work contacts usually studied as weak 
or strong are in fact collaboration ties. In this paper, we have been considering 
work contacts mainly as dyads and we did not explore the broader form of the 
network that makes collaboration ties valuable. Must they be rather cohesive or 
non redundant? This issue is partly contingent on the technology and the way 
it coordinates people (Podolny, Baron, 1997; Hansen et alii., 2001) but also on 
the position in the group. In financial industry, building on the one hand 
closed and tied network creates a strong group solidarity and builds a team 
ready for defection (Lazega, 2001), but on the other hand, for the leading head 
of desk or head of trading room, maintaining some structural holes between 
main deputies avoids that the deputies form coalition against the leader and 
maintains his/her preeminence and his/her indispensability for engineering 
collective move. This analysis suggest therefore a tradeoff between brokerage 
and closure (Godechot, 2008b), that is a little different from that established by 
Burt (2005). Further research is needed in order to establish the factors that 
determine equilibrium in the collaboration ties framework. 
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